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william p. marshall 
Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys 
General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive 
abstract.   Proponents of the unitary executive have contended that its adoption by the 
framers “swept plural executive forms into the ash bin of history.” Virtually every state 
government, however, has a divided executive in which executive power is apportioned among 
different executive officers independent of gubernatorial control. Focusing on the Office of the 
State Attorney General, this Essay examines the state experience with the divided executive and 
demonstrates that the model of an independent attorney general has proved both workable and 
effective in providing an intrabranch check on state executive power. The Essay then discusses 
the potential application of the model of the divided executive at the federal level. For a number 
of reasons, there has been a dramatic expansion of presidential power in the last half century 
with the result that Congress and the courts are often no longer able to constrain executive 
power in a timely and effective manner. In such circumstances, the only possible check on 
presidential power must come from within the executive branch. Yet the ability of the Federal 
Attorney General to provide such a check is, at best, illusory because, under the structure of the 
unitary executive, the Attorney General is subject to presidential control. Accordingly, the Essay 
questions whether the federal government should borrow from the state experience and make 
the Attorney General an independent officer. 
author.  William R. Kenan Distinguished Professor of Law, University of North Carolina 
at Chapel Hill. I am grateful to Elizabeth Ferrill and Tyler Tarrant for their research assistance. I 
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Proponents of the federal unitary executive have contended that its 
adoption by the Framers “swept . . . plural executive forms into the ash bin of 
history.”1 The federal model, however, has not been embraced by the states. 
The states, rather, employ a divided executive that apportions executive power 
among different executive officers not subject to gubernatorial control.2 In 
forty-eight states, for example, the Attorney General does not serve at the will 
of the Governor;3 and in many states, other executive branch officers such as 
the Secretary of State, Treasurer, and Auditor are also independent.4 
The divided executive holds the theoretical advantages of dispersing power 
and serving as a check against any particular officer’s overreaching, virtues that 
might be seen as particularly appealing given concerns about executive branch 
excesses at the federal level. But the structure also potentially undermines the 
virtues of energy and efficiency, political accountability, and separation of 
powers that the Framers of the Federal Constitution associated with the 
unitary executive model. The question then arises as to whether the divided 
executive provides a viable and workable model for executive power 
implementation. 
Focusing on the Office of the Attorney General, this Essay examines the 
divided executive. Part I examines the state experience. It provides a brief 
discussion of the history and evolution of the Office of the Attorney General, 
explores how the divided executive works in practice, and canvasses the cases 
that address how conflicts between governors and state attorneys general are 
resolved. Part I concludes that the divided executive model can foster an 
intrabranch system of checks and balances without undercutting the ability of 
the executive branch to function effectively. Part II then probes the question of 
 
1.  Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 
25 (1995). 
2.  Patrick C. McGinley, Separation of Powers, State Constitutions & the Attorney General: Who 
Represents the State?, 99 W. VA. L. REV. 721, 722 (1997). 
3.  The Attorney General is independently elected in forty-three states and is appointed by the 
legislature in Maine and the Supreme Court in Tennessee. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, THE 
BOOK OF THE STATES 268 (2005). In New Jersey, New Hampshire, and Hawaii, the Attorney 
General is appointed by the Governor but is not removable at will. See HAW. CONST. art V, § 
6; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, arts. 46, 47, 73; N.J. CONST. art. V, § IV, paras. 3, 5. Only in Alaska 
and Wyoming does the Attorney General serve entirely at the Governor’s behest. See 
ALASKA CONST. art. III, § 25; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-1-601 (2005). 
4.  See DANIEL R. GRANT & LLOYD B. OMDAHL, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA (5th 
ed. 1986). 
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whether the federal government should borrow from the state experience and 
make the Federal Attorney General an independent officer.5 We live in an era of 
increasing (and, some would say, increasingly unchecked) presidential power. 
Part II accordingly considers whether the federal government should construct 
an intrabranch system of checks and balances, consistent with the state 
experience, in order to guard against executive branch excess. 
i. the state experience with the divided executive: 
governors and state attorneys general 
A.  Common Law Origins of the Office of the Attorney General 
The roots of the Office of the Attorney General date back to the thirteenth 
century, when English kings appointed attorneys to represent regal interests in 
each major court or geographical area.6 Initially, the attorneys had limited 
powers, based either on the courts in which they appeared or the business that 
they were assigned to conduct.7 During the Middle Ages, however, this practice 
was superseded by the appointment of a single attorney with broad authority, 
including the power to appoint subordinates to carry out his responsibilities.8 
The Attorney General emerged as chief legal adviser to the Crown and was 
often appointed for life tenure—a practice that continued until the reign of 
Henry VIII when it was changed to service at the pleasure of the Crown.9 
Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the duties of the 
Attorney General continued to evolve and expand; with eminent tenants such 
as Edward Coke and Francis Bacon, the Office also continued to gain in 
prestige.10 The Attorney General was often summoned by writ of attendance to 
the House of Lords where he was consulted on bills and points of law.11 In 
1673, he began to sit in the House of Commons, advising that body and 
 
5.  This Essay assumes, for purposes of discussion, that making the Office of the Attorney 
General independent, either by election or appointment, would require a constitutional 
amendment. See Proposals Regarding an Independent Attorney General, 1 Op. Off. Legal 
Counsel 75, 77-78 (1977). 
6.  6 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 459 (2d ed. 1937). 
7.  Id. 
8.  Id. at 460-61. 
9.  Id. 
10.  Rita W. Cooley, Predecessors of the Federal Attorney General: The Attorney General in England 
and the American Colonies, 2 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 304, 307 (1958). 
11.  6 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 6, at 463. 
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assisting in the drafting of legislation.12 He also gave legal advice to the various 
departments of state and appeared for them in court.13 
Importantly, during this period, the Attorney General established that his 
duty of representation extended to the public interest and not just to the 
ministries of government.14 In fact, by 1757, the Attorney General was able to 
refuse “to prosecute or to stop a prosecution on the orders of a department of 
the government, if he disapproved of this course of action.”15 Accordingly, the 
Attorney General became less the government’s lawyer and more an 
independent public official “responsible for justice.”16 
B. The State Attorneys General 
The Office of the Attorney General was brought over to the colonies, where 
it was modeled after its English counterpart;17 and at the time of the founding, 
it existed in all thirteen of the original states.18 The terms of tenure varied 
considerably. North Carolina, for example, provided for a lifetime appointment 
by the legislature.19 In New York, the Attorney General was appointed by the 
Governor with the advice and consent of an Executive Council but he could be 
impeached and removed from office for “mal and corrupt conduct” only by a 
two-thirds vote of those present in the Assembly.20 Delaware allowed the 
Governor to appoint the Attorney General, upon confirmation by the Privy 
 
12.  Id. at 465. 
13.  Cooley, supra note 10, at 307. 
14.  12 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 305 (1st ed. 1938). 
15.  Id. 
16.  NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE ATTORNEYS GEN., STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL: POWERS AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES 6 (Lynne M. Ross ed., 1990) [hereinafter STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL]. 
17.  DANIEL J. MEADOR, THE PRESIDENT, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE 5 (1980). Notably, the Crown granted colonial attorneys general the same powers 
and duties as the attorneys general had at home. The effectiveness of the colonial attorneys 
general, however, was far more limited than their English counterparts owing to their 
significant lack of resources. STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 16, at 6. 
18.  See generally Oliver W. Hammonds, The Attorney General in American Colonies, in 2 ANGLO-
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY SERIES, ser. 1, 3 (Paul M. Hamlin ed., New York Univ. Sch. of 
Law 1939). 
19.  N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XIII. 
20.  N.Y. CONST. of 1777, arts. XXIII, XXXIII. 
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Council, for a term of five years.21 Rhode Island, alone among the original 
states, provided that the Attorney General would be popularly elected.22 
The Framers of the Federal Constitution apparently placed the Attorney 
General under the control of the President,23 thereby adopting the model of the 
unitary executive, at least insofar as they did not directly create separate federal 
officers independent of the President.24 But the federal model proved to have 
very little influence over the development of state government. In fact, in the 
years following the ratification of the Federal Constitution, the states tended to 
reject the federal model because they were concerned with the concentration of 
too much power in one executive officer. Ohio, for example, in reaction to a 
territorial Governor who was perceived to be too autocratic, drafted its first 
state constitution in 1802 specifically to minimize the authority of the Governor 
by dispersing executive power over a range of independent executive branch 
officers.25 
As the nation matured, many states created independent attorneys general 
and afforded the Office even greater autonomy by making it a popularly elected 
position. Again, the states’ purpose was to weaken the power of a central chief 
executive and further an intrabranch system of checks and balances. Thus, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court observed, in reference to the state’s 1851 
constitution, that: 
Rather than conferring all executive authority upon a governor, the 
drafters of our constitution divided the executive powers of state 
government among six elected officers. This was a conscious effort on 
 
21.  DEL. CONST. of 1776. 
22.  This practice dated back to 1650. See R.I. Sec’y of State, Office of the Attorney General, 
http://www.state.ri.us/govtracker/index.php?page=DetailDeptAgency&eid=3877 (last 
visited Aug. 5, 2006). The Office of the Attorney General was formally established by 
constitutional provision in 1842. R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. VIII, § 1. 
23.  As will be discussed subsequently, it is somewhat ambiguous whether the Office was 
originally intended to be subject to presidential control. See infra notes 126-127 and 
accompanying text. 
24.  The question of whether Congress could create officers or agencies not subject to 
presidential control has been, of course, the dominant issue in the unitary executive debate. 
See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power To Execute the 
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the 
Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (1994). 
25.  STEVEN H. STEINGLASS & GINO J. SCARSELLI, THE OHIO STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE 
GUIDE 163 (2004). Interestingly, the Attorney General was not one of the executive officers 
established in Ohio’s first constitution and was created first by statute in 1848 and then by 
constitutional provision in 1851. Id. at 163-64. 
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the part of the drafters, who were well aware of the colonial aversion to 
royal governors who possessed unified executive powers.26 
Accordingly, as the nineteenth century unfurled, most new states provided 
in their constitutions for the popular election of an attorney general (and other 
executive branch officials) while many of the established states amended their 
constitutions to the same end. As a result of this trend, at present, forty-three 
state attorneys general are elected and forty-eight are free from gubernatorial 
control.27 Notably, no state has reversed direction and made its Attorney 
General subservient to the Governor.28 
The Office of the Attorney General has now evolved to have jurisdiction 
over a wide range of matters, although its specific powers vary considerably 
from state to state. In some states, for example, the Attorney General has 
statutory authority to bring consumer protection, environmental, civil rights, 
civil fraud, securities, and antitrust actions; some offices are also charged with 
maintaining oversight over public lands and charitable trusts.29 Many state 
attorneys general have significant authority to investigate both governmental 
and non-governmental misconduct. Attorneys general also play an important 
role in criminal law enforcement, with some state offices having direct 
prosecutorial powers or supervisory authority over law enforcement officers.30 
Some state attorneys general additionally have broad common law powers to 
sue in the name of the public interest or in parens patriae.31 Finally, in virtually 
all states, the Attorney General is designated the state’s chief legal officer.32 The 
problem, as shall be discussed, however, is that no matter how extensive the 
Attorney General’s powers have become, they still must be reconciled with 
 
26.  State ex rel. Mattson v. Kiedrowski, 391 N.W.2d 777, 782 (Minn. 1986). 
27.  See supra note 3. 
28.  Scott M. Matheson, Jr., Constitutional Status and Role of the State Attorney General, 6 U. FLA. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 28 (1993). 
29.  The authority of attorneys general in specific subject areas is catalogued in STATE 
ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 16. 
30.  Id. at 278-79. 
31.  See, e.g., In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 218 F.R.D. 508, 521 (E.D. Mich. 2003) 
(describing variations in the common law powers of attorneys general across states). Not 
every state, however, invests the Attorney General with such authority. See, e.g., Blumenthal 
v. Barnes, 804 A.2d 152, 165 (Conn. 2002) (holding that the Connecticut Attorney General 
does not have common law powers). 
32.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-192(A) (2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-13-102(2.5) 
(2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 45-15-10 (2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 7-5-1 (2006); see also STATE 
ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 16, at 40. 
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those of the Governor, who, in virtually every state, enjoys the even more 
expansive charge of assuring that the laws are faithfully executed.33 
C. Governors and State Attorneys General 
Not surprisingly, a divided executive creates substantial opportunities and 
incentives for conflict.34 First, there are matters of simple politics. In states 
where the Governor and the Attorney General are independently elected, the 
two officers may come from different political parties with diametrically 
opposed partisan agendas. If so, they can be expected to be in constant political 
opposition to each other. Moreover, even when from the same party, the two 
officers can, and often are, divided by personal rivalries or ideological 
differences. And even when the two officers agree on a particular issue, they 
may compete with each other to be the most aggressive in addressing the issue 
to curry favor with a particular constituency.35 Add to this the political reality 
that the Office of the Attorney General has long been seen by many of its 
occupants as a stepping stone to the Governor’s office36 and the blueprint for 
confrontation and conflict is manifest. Finally, disputes may occur because of 
the differing visions the officers may have concerning each other’s roles. 
Governors tend to view attorneys general as subservient officers. But most 
attorneys general, while acknowledging some obligation to represent the 
Governor and the other parts of state government, tend to perceive their 
overriding obligation to be to the broader concerns of representing the state, 
the law, and the public interest.37 
 
33.  See, e.g., ILL. CONST., art. 5, § 8 (“The Governor shall have the supreme executive power, 
and shall be responsible for the faithful execution of the laws.”); MONT. CONST. art. 6, § 4 
(same); PA. CONST. art. 4, § 2 (same). 
34.  Thad L. Beyle, Governors, in POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN STATES 180, 192 (Virginia Gray et al. 
eds., 4th ed. 1983) (“These two offices [the Governor and the Attorney General] . . . have 
the potential for built-in conflict at several levels, from politics to policy to 
administration.”). 
35.  See, e.g., Al Baker, Pataki, Environmentalist? Little and Late, Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 
2003, at B2. 
36.  See William N. Thompson, Should We Elect or Appoint State Government Executives? Some 
New Data Concerning State Attorneys General, 8 MIDWEST REV. PUB. ADMIN. 17, 29-31 (1974). 
37.  See Matheson, supra note 28, at 12 & n.57 (1993) (citing the articles of two state attorneys 
general, William A. Saxbe, Functions of the Office of Attorney General of Ohio, 6 CLEV.-
MARSHALL L. REV. 331, 334 (1957), and Lacy H. Thornburg, Changes in the State’s Law Firm: 
The Powers, Duties and Operations of the Office of the Attorney General, 12 CAMPBELL L. REV. 
343, 359 (1990)). 
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What is remarkable, then, in reviewing the state experience, is that 
debilitating conflict has not materialized. This is not to say that serious 
disputes have never occurred or that governors have never complained about 
having to deal with independent attorneys general (or vice versa). Certainly 
they have. And it is also true that the divided executive has occasionally been 
the target of reforms that would make the Attorney General subject to 
gubernatorial appointment and removal.38 But history suggests that both 
governors and attorneys general have generally learned to cooperate effectively 
within a divided executive framework. 
The reasons why cooperation, rather than conflict, has been the rule are not 
complex. On one side, the Governor, even if he believes he is unduly 
constrained by an attorney general’s position, has the general incentive to 
comply because he may not want to be seen as defying the Attorney General on 
matters for which the public expects that the Attorney General, as chief legal 
officer, will have greater expertise. A Governor who rejects the Attorney 
General’s position therefore risks expending political capital by appearing 
reckless, if not lawless. Moreover, he risks even greater vulnerability on that 
point if his legal position eventually fails in court. 
On the other side, the Attorney General may also be restrained from 
overreaching because she is aware that her role is, in large part, defined by 
public expectations and that her primary obligation is to defend, not 
contradict, the policies of state officers or agencies, except when those policies 
violate the law.39 Indeed, this understanding is so prevalent that virtually all of 
the state attorneys general have institutionalized it in in-house memoranda.40 
Many of the more powerful incentives for cooperation, moreover, are 
mutual. To begin with, as repeat and interdependent players, both sides have 
the incentive to maintain a functioning relationship to ensure they can fulfill 
the duties of their respective offices. They may also feel significant political 
pressure to work together because it will be harmful to both if they are seen as 
unwilling or unable to work across political divides. The electorate, after all, 
does not tend to reward those who bring government to a standstill. Further, 
both sides may be motivated to come together because reaching internal 
consensus may fortify their actions against third parties. When both the 
Governor and the Attorney General agree that a course of action is permissible, 
the authority behind that position is greater than when either party reaches 
 
38.  See, e.g., id. at 28 n.148. 
39.  James E. Tierney, The State Attorney General: Who Is the Client? (Sept. 1, 1995), 
http://c-128.port5.com/articles/art2.html. 
40.  Id. 
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that conclusion alone. Finally, and perhaps unduly idealistically, the Governor 
and Attorney General may be united by a common sense of duty. As one court 
has noted, a divided executive requires the executive officers to “combine and 
cooperate (even if they have differing policy views and perspectives) to provide 
an efficient and effective executive branch of government.”41 It may be that 
state governments traditionally have taken that duty seriously. 
D. The Cases Addressing the Relative Powers of Governors and Attorneys 
General 
Not all disputes between governors and attorneys general regarding their 
respective powers are resolved internally and some, not surprisingly, proceed 
to litigation. The relatively few cases addressing intra-executive branch 
disputes, however, are significant for our purposes in that they provide useful 
insight into the types of legal conflicts that can be triggered by a divided 
executive, how courts might approach these conflicts, and, by implication, 
whether a divided executive is a viable and sustainable structure.42 These cases 
can be broken into three categories: (1) cases in which the Attorney General 
chooses to exercise independent legal judgment and either refuses to represent 
the Governor (or other executive officers or agencies) or takes an opposed 
position in litigation; (2) independent actions brought by the Attorney General 
directly against the Governor or other members of the executive; and (3) cases 
raising the issue of whether the Attorney General has the right to initiate 
enforcement actions against private parties without the Governor’s approval or 
in direct contravention of the Governor’s wishes. This Section first canvasses 
the cases within each category and then evaluates whether the approaches 
utilized by the courts are effective in furthering the purposes the divided 
executive is designed to achieve. 
1. The Power of the Attorney General To Exercise Independent Legal 
Judgment in Litigation 
The first and most common category of cases addresses the right of the 
Attorney General to refuse to take the Governor’s (or other executive officer’s 
 
41.  State ex rel. McGraw v. Burton, 569 S.E.2d 99, 109 (W. Va. 2002) (emphasis added). 
42.  The cases may also have implicit significance in that the very fact that courts have been able 
to entertain intrabranch disputes reinforces the viability of the divided executive by 
suggesting that an effective judicial backstop may be available to resolve any potentially 
debilitating conflicts. 
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or agency’s) position in court. Must the Attorney General represent the 
position of the Governor on a disputed legal issue, or is she free to substitute 
her own independent legal judgment as to the best interests of the state? The 
majority rule favors attorney general independence.43 Her primary duty, as the 
state’s chief law officer, is to represent the public interest and not simply “the 
machinery of government.”44 
In Secretary of Administration & Finance v. Attorney General,45 for example, 
the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the Attorney General can refuse to 
appeal an adverse decision despite the contrary wishes of his executive agency 
client: “[W]hen an agency head recommends a course of action, the Attorney 
General must consider the ramifications of that action on the interests of the 
Commonwealth and the public generally, as well as on the official himself and 
his agency.”46 An Alabama case, Ex parte Weaver,47 states this principle even 
more broadly: 
The most far-reaching of the attorney general’s common-law powers is 
the authority to control litigation involving state and public interests. It 
is generally accepted that the attorney general is authorized to bring 
actions on the state’s behalf. As the state’s chief legal officer, the 
attorney-general has power, both under common law and by statute, to 
 
43.  Manchin v. Browning, 296 S.E.2d 909, 923 (W. Va. 1982) (Neely, J., dissenting) (urging 
that the rule in the majority of jurisdictions be adopted by the court). 
44.  Commonwealth ex rel. Hancock v. Paxton, 516 S.W.2d 865, 867 (Ky. 1974); see also id. at 868 
(“[I]n case of a conflict of duties the Attorney General’s primary obligation is to the 
Commonwealth, the body politic, rather than to its officers, departments, commissions, or 
agencies.”). The Hancock court noted that at common law the Attorney General represented 
the king, “he being the embodiment of the state. But under the democratic form of 
government now prevailing the people are the king . . . .” Id. at 867 (internal citation 
omitted); see also Sandersen v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala. (Ex parte Weaver), 570 So. 
2d 675, 684 (Ala. 1990) (holding that the Attorney General had the authority to dismiss 
legal proceedings over the objection of an executive agency). 
45.  326 N.E.2d 334 (Mass. 1975). 
46.  Id. at 338. Two years later, in Feeney v. Commonwealth, 366 N.E.2d 1262, 1266-67 (Mass. 
1977), the Massachusetts Supreme Court came to the same result when the parties’ 
intentions were reversed, holding that the Attorney General could prosecute an appeal even 
when his executive agency client objected. 
47.  570 So. 2d 675. 
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make any disposition of the state’s litigation that he deems for its best 
interest.48 
Not all states, to be sure, adopt this reasoning. In Manchin v. Browning,49 
the West Virginia Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus requiring the 
Attorney General to represent the Secretary of State in federal court over the 
Attorney General’s objection. The court noted that the Attorney General was in 
a traditional attorney-client relationship with other state executive officers and 
could not decline representation.50 Thus, the Attorney General’s authority to 
manage the litigation was limited to developing the case “so as to reflect and 
vindicate the lawful public policy of the officer he represent[ed].”51 
In Santa Rita Mining Co. v. Department of Property Valuation,52 the Attorney 
General appealed an adverse property tax judgment against the express wishes 
of his agency client. The defendants successfully petitioned for a special action 
to dismiss the pending court of appeals action; the Arizona Supreme Court 
held that the Attorney General lacked the authority to maintain the appeal 
without the approval of his agency client. The court concluded that the 
Governor alone was empowered to protect the public interest and ensure that 
the laws are faithfully executed.53 Accordingly, the Attorney General was bound 
to represent the position of the executive branch and not his own views of the 
public interest in order to preserve the appropriate division of powers within 
the executive branch. 
In one unusual case, the court found that the Governor and the Attorney 
General had concurrent powers. The underlying litigation in Perdue v. Baker54 
involved a challenge to the State of Georgia’s reapportionment plan. A lower 
federal court held that the plan violated the Voting Rights Act. Before the 
appeals were completed, the Georgia legislature passed a back-up plan to 
implement if the courts continued to invalidate the original plan. Apparently 
 
48.  Id. at 677 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Ex parte Weaver also suggests that the 
Attorney General should allow the state agency to employ counsel to represent its position if 
the Attorney General refuses to do so. Id. at 678-79. 
49.  296 S.E.2d 909, 921 (W. Va. 1982). The Manchin court did acknowledge, however, that its 
decision did not follow the majority rule. Id. at 921 n.6. 
50.  Id. at 919-21; see also Chun v. Bd. of Trs., 952 P.2d 1215, 1234 (Haw. 1998) (holding that 
when the Attorney General’s views differ from those of her agency client, the Attorney 
General cannot control the litigation “as to advance her view of the ‘public welfare’”). 
51.  Manchin, 296 S.E.2d at 921. 
52.  530 P.2d 360 (Ariz. 1975). 
53.  Id. at 362 (citing Ariz. State Land Dep’t v. McFate, 348 P.2d 912 (Ariz. 1960)). 
54.  586 S.E.2d 606 (Ga. 2003). 
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favoring the back-up plan over the original, the Governor sued the Attorney 
General seeking to force him to drop his appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
The Georgia Supreme Court rejected the Governor’s petition. Explaining that 
its decision was based in part upon the policy of promoting a system of checks 
and balances between the two officers, the court held that both the Governor 
and the Attorney General were entitled to represent the state before the 
Georgia Supreme Court.55 
2. The Power of the Attorney General To Sue the Governor or Other 
Executive Officers 
The second category of cases comprises those in which the Attorney 
General sues the Governor or other executive officers. For example, an issue 
occasionally arises regarding the power of the Attorney General to challenge 
the constitutionality of a state enactment by suing the state executive charged 
with its enforcement,56 including the Governor when appropriate.57 In such 
cases, the majority rule vests power in the Attorney General to bring the 
action.58 Thus, in People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson,59 a Democratic Attorney 
General contended that a redistricting plan signed by the Republican Governor 
violated the state constitution and sued the Secretary of State to invalidate the 
plan. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the Attorney General’s 
prerogative, holding that “the Attorney General must consider the broader 
institutional concerns of the state even though [those] concerns [are] not 
shared by” other executive officers.60 
Case law also supports the power of the Attorney General to sue the 
Governor over matters involving the Governor’s own actions. In State ex rel. 
 
55.  Id. at 610. 
56.  See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Hancock v. Paxton, 516 S.W.2d 865, 867-68 (Ky. 1974) 
(“[T]he duty of the Attorney General to uphold the Constitution . . . surely embraces the 
power to protect it from attacks in the form of legislation as well as from attacks by way of 
lawsuits by other persons against state officers or agencies.”). 
57.  Cf. State ex rel. Douglas v. Thone, 286 N.W.2d 249 (Neb. 1979) (allowing, without 
discussion, the Attorney General to bring an action against the Governor to enjoin the 
implementation of a statute). 
58.  Hansen v. Barlow, 456 P.2d 177, 177-78 (Utah 1969). But cf. State v. Burning Tree Club, 481 
A.2d 785 (Md. 1984) (holding that the Maryland Attorney General does not have common 
law, statutory, or state constitutional authority to initiate a declaratory judgment action 
challenging the constitutionality of a state statute). 
59.  79 P.3d 1221 (Colo. 2003). 
60.  Id. at 1231. 
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Condon v. Hodges,61 the South Carolina Supreme Court allowed the Attorney 
General to sue the Governor for attempting to circumvent the provisions of an 
appropriations bill. Rejecting the argument that a lawyer cannot sue his own 
client, the court held that the Attorney General has a dual role as the 
Governor’s attorney and as the executive official charged with vindicating 
wrongs against the citizens of the state, with the power to seek legal redress for 
separation-of-powers violations by other state executive officers.62 
Although there are few cases in which the Attorney General directly sues 
the Governor, Hodges is not the only example. The Mississippi Supreme Court 
has allowed the Attorney General to intervene on behalf of plaintiff legislators 
seeking to declare that a Governor’s partial vetoes of certain bills were 
unconstitutional.63 The Kentucky Supreme Court, although holding that the 
Attorney General had not justified his claim for injunctive relief on the merits, 
allowed him to bring an action to enjoin the Governor from being sworn in 
and acting as a member of the state university board of trustees pursuant to the 
Governor’s own self-appointment.64 And the Florida Supreme Court allowed 
the Attorney General to bring a quo warranto action against the Lieutenant 
Governor seeking his removal because he lacked necessary qualifications.65 
Nevertheless, the right of the Attorney General to sue executive branch 
officers or agencies has not been universally approved. In Arizona State Land 
Department v. McFate,66 for example, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the 
Attorney General could not bring suit against a state agency to enjoin its sale of 
public lands. The court explained that “the Governor alone, and not the 
Attorney General, is responsible for the supervision of the executive 
department and is obligated and empowered to protect the interests of the 
 
61.  562 S.E.2d 623 (S.C. 2002). 
62.  Id. at 627-28. 
63.  Fordice v. Bryan, 651 So. 2d 998 (Miss. 1995). Even more recently, the Mississippi Attorney 
General sued to block the Governor’s cut-back on Medicaid. See James Dao, In Mississippi, 
Setting the Pace for a New Generation of Republican Governors, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2005, at 
A18. 
64.  Commonwealth ex rel. Cowan v. Wilkinson, 828 S.W.2d 610 (Ky. 1992). 
65.  State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Gleason, 12 Fla. 190 (1868); cf. United States v. Troutman, 
814 F.2d 1428, 1438 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that it was proper for the Attorney General to 
assist federal officials in the prosecution of an executive officer because “a state attorney 
general has a primary responsibility to protect the interests of the people of the state and 
must be free to prosecute violations of those interests by a state officer regardless of his 
representation of the state officer in past or pending litigation”). 
66.  348 P.2d 912 (Ariz. 1960). 
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people and the State.”67 Similarly, in Hill v. Texas Water Quality Board,68 the 
Texas Court of Civil Appeals held that the Attorney General lacked the 
authority to bring suit to set aside an agency rule, finding no independent 
authority for the Attorney General to represent the public interest against the 
specific interests of his agency client. 
3. The Power of the Attorney General To Initiate Enforcement Actions 
Against Private Parties 
The final category of cases concerns the power of the Attorney General to 
proactively initiate civil or criminal actions against private parties. This power, 
needless to say, may have a profound effect on a state’s policy agenda. For 
example, a governor who promises to create a pro-business climate could be 
hampered in achieving this result if the state’s attorney general is aggressive in 
maintaining consumer protection or antitrust actions against the state’s 
industries. Similarly, a governor who runs for office as an anti-pornography 
crusader will be seriously limited in his ability to deliver on this issue if the 
state’s attorney general refuses to bring pornography prosecutions. 
Whether the State Attorney General has the power to initiate criminal or 
civil actions independent of the Governor is largely a function of statutory 
authority and, particularly in civil matters, whether the Attorney General is 
deemed to enjoy common law powers. Thus, in Ohio v. United Transportation, 
Inc.,69 the court held that, because he had common law authority, the Attorney 
General of Ohio could bring an antitrust action under state and federal law 
against local taxicab companies without the approval of either the Governor or 
the General Assembly.70 The court stated that “the broad inherent common law 
powers of the attorney general in . . . contesting infringements of the rights of 
the general public” had been long recognized.71 This common law power, 
moreover, is quite broad. As the court held in Florida ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon 
 
67.  Id. at 918. See also ARIZ. CONST. art. V, §§ 1, 4 (charging the Governor with the faithful 
execution of the laws and stating that the duties of the Attorney General shall be as 
prescribed by law). 
68.  568 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978). 
69.  506 F. Supp. 1278 (S.D. Ohio 1981). 
70.  Id.; see also Florida ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1976) (affirming the 
power of the Attorney General to maintain an antitrust suit against various oil companies). 
71.  United Transp., 506 F. Supp. at 1281-82; see also In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 218 
F.R.D. 508, 520-21 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (“Plaintiff States, by their Attorneys General, had the 
authority to settle and release indirect purchaser claims in a parens patriae or other 
representative capacity.”). 
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Corp.,72 the Attorney General is entrusted, under the common law, with “wide 
discretion” and a “significant degree of autonomy” in determining what is in 
the public interest.73 Indeed, the Attorney General’s common law authority is 
so unfettered that it may allow her to bring suits in the public interest even 
when other executive officers or agencies oppose such actions.74 
In other states, however, the courts have held that the Attorney General’s 
powers are far more circumscribed. In State ex rel. Haskell v. Huston,75 for 
example, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the Attorney General must 
have the Governor’s permission to maintain a civil nuisance action against an 
oil company because it is within the Governor’s responsibility to see that the 
laws are “faithfully administered.”76 Moreover, in a few states, not only is the 
Attorney General prohibited from initiating actions without the Governor’s 
approval, but the Governor can also compel the Attorney General to prosecute 
an action even when the Attorney General does not want to proceed. 
4. The Cases in Theoretical Perspective 
Some of the results in the cases reviewed in the previous Subsections can be 
explained simply as the product of statutory interpretation by the courts. The 
McFate decision, for example, was based on the relatively broad powers 
accorded to the Governor under the Arizona Constitution compared to the 
narrow grant of authority vested in the Attorney General.77 In other cases, such 
as Shevin, when the constitutional and statutory principles were less explicit, 
the courts had to rely on more general principles.78 
 
72.  526 F.2d at 266. 
73.  Id. at 268-69, 271. 
74.  See id. at 272; see also State v. Tex. Co., 7 So. 2d 161, 162 (La. 1942) (holding that the 
Attorney General “is not required to obtain the permission of the Governor or any other 
executive or administrative officer or board in order to exercise” his right to sue on behalf of 
the state); State ex rel. Bd. of Transp. v. Fremont, E. & M.V.R. Co., 35 N.W. 118, 120 (Neb. 
1887) (holding that the Attorney General could proceed with the prosecution of a case over 
the objections of the executive agency involved in the suit). 
75.  97 P. 982 (Okla. 1908). 
76.  Id. at 985-87 (concluding that the Governor has the sole and exclusive right to exercise 
executive discretion to determine if a suit should be brought on behalf of the state, and that 
the Attorney General cannot interfere with the Governor’s discretion); see also State ex rel. 
Cartwright v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 663 P.2d 718 (Okla. 1982) (noting that the Attorney General 
must seek the Governor’s permission to initiate a suit). 
77.  Ariz. State Land Dep’t v. McFate, 348 P.2d 912, 912 (Ariz. 1960). 
78.  526 F.2d at 266. 
MARSHALL_09-12-06_BIG FINALE 9/25/2006 11:41:11 PM 
the yale law journal 115:2446  2006 
2462 
 
But whether derived from constitutional provision, statutory text, or 
judicial gloss, two general approaches have emerged in deciding how the 
powers of the Governor and the Attorney General are to be allocated in a 
divided executive. The first, based on ethics, suggests that the conflicts should 
be resolved in accord with the principles of the attorney-client relationship. 
The second, based on the structure of the divided executive, looks to the 
policies and understandings underlying that model as the basis for resolution. 
Each will be discussed in turn. 
a. The Argument from Ethics 
The leading case in support of the position that an attorney general is 
bound by the principles of the attorney-client relationship to represent the 
interests of his state officer or agency client is People ex rel. Deukmejian v. 
Brown.79 As the California Supreme Court stated in that case, there is nothing 
unique to the duties of the Attorney General that “justif[ies] relaxation of the 
prevailing rules governing an attorney’s right to assume a position adverse to 
his clients or former clients.”80 The approach taken in Deukmejian has an 
initial, intuitive attraction. After all, if the Attorney General is the lawyer and 
the Governor the client, the normal expectation would be that the former 
should advance the latter’s legal positions.81 In fact, however, the attorney-
client relationship approach is easily dismissed.82 
To begin with, this approach ignores the fact that the Attorney General’s 
role is significantly more complex than that of a private attorney. Since 
seventeenth-century England, the Attorney General has generally been deemed 
to represent the “state” or public interest and not only the machineries of 
government.83 Moreover, in the modern era of expansive government, the 
Attorney General is also often charged with representing a wide range of state 
 
79.  624 P.2d 1206 (Cal. 1981). Deukmejian, although the leading case in support of this position, 
is actually somewhat unusual in that the Attorney General had previously counseled the 
state agency about how to implement the law at issue. 
80.  Id. at 1209; see also Tice v. Dep’t of Transp., 312 S.E.2d 241, 246 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) 
(holding that the Attorney General is bound by rules governing the attorney-client 
relationship); Manchin v. Browning, 296 S.E.2d 909, 920 (W. Va. 1982) (same). 
81.  See Bill Aleshire, Note, The Texas Attorney General: Attorney or General?, 20 REV. LITIG. 187 
(2000). 
82.  For a thoughtful discussion of the ethical issues involved, see Justin G. Davids, State 
Attorneys General and the Client-Attorney Relationship: Establishing the Power To Sue State 
Officers, 38 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 365 (2005). 
83.  See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text. 
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officers and agencies, many of whom have positions diametrically opposed to 
each other. Accordingly, and in recognition of this reality, most courts have 
held that an attorney general does not violate ethical rules when she engages in 
the dual representation of competing state entities.84 It is therefore not a giant 
step to conclude that dual representation of a state entity and the state or public 
interest is also not an ethical violation and, indeed, a majority of jurisdictions 
have so held.85 
Furthermore, the nature of an independent attorney general belies the 
conclusion that an attorney general should be ethically bound to represent her 
officer client. Ethical rules do not provide an attorney with much room to reject 
the position of her client86 and, if they in fact limited her authority, there 
would be little reason for an attorney general to have independent status. 
Certainly, an attorney general, ethically bound to represent a governor, would 
not serve as a check on a governor who was intent on exceeding his 
constitutional or statutory authority. At best, she would be able only to refuse 
to facilitate the governor’s actions.87 
Finally, ethical concerns also weigh against binding an attorney general by 
the attorney-client relationship. As the Colorado Supreme Court noted in 
People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson,88 imposing a rigid obligation on the Attorney 
General to advance the executive’s positions can undermine the Attorney 
General’s ethical obligations to uphold the law and constitution when the 
 
84.  E.g., Conn. Comm’n on Special Revenue v. Conn. Freedom of Info. Comm’n, 387 A.2d 533 
(Conn. 1978); People ex rel. Sklodowski v. State, 642 N.E.2d 1180 (Ill. 1994); Pub. Util. 
Comm’n v. Cofer, 754 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. 1988). 
85.  E.g., People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221 (Colo. 2003); EPA v. Pollution Control 
Bd., 372 N.E.2d 50 (Ill. 1977); Commonwealth ex rel. Hancock v. Paxton, 516 S.W.2d 865 
(Ky. Ct. App. 1974); Humphrey ex rel. State v. McLaren, 402 N.W.2d 535 (Minn. 1987); 
State ex rel. Allain v. Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 418 So. 2d 779 (Miss. 1982). But see 
Deukmejian, 624 P.2d at 1206; City of York v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 295 A.2d 825 (Pa. 
1972). 
86.  See, e.g., OHIO CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-1 (2004) (“The professional judgment 
of a lawyer should be exercised, within the bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of his 
client and free of compromising influences and loyalties.”); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2004). 
87.  Manchin v. Browning, 296 S.E.2d 909, 923 (W. Va. 1982) (Neely, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that defining the Attorney General’s role with reference to the attorney-client relationship 
renders the Attorney General “analogous to a legal aid attorney for State employees sued in 
their official capacity . . . [who is] bound to advocate zealously the personal opinions of the 
officer whom he represents”). 
88.  79 P.3d 1221, 1231 (Colo. 2003). 
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Governor seeks to defend a measure that the Attorney General believes is 
unlawful.89 
b. The Argument from Structure 
The structural approach to disputes between the Governor and the 
Attorney General focuses on the respective roles of the two officers in the 
divided executive and questions which role deserves particular deference in a 
specific context. In certain circumstances, specifically with respect to policy 
judgments, a structural analysis supports the authority of the Governor (or 
other executive officer or agency) over that of the Attorney General. Consider 
Motor Club of Iowa v. Department of Transportation of Iowa,90 in which a motor 
club challenged the validity of a state agency rule establishing a sixty-five foot 
length limitation for trucks.91 After losing in the trial court, the agency decided 
against an appeal because a majority of agency commissioners no longer 
supported the length limit. The Attorney General, however, attempted to 
pursue the appeal without agency approval. The court held that the Attorney 
General did not have the authority to proceed without agency authorization. 
From a structural perspective the decision makes sense. After all, if the 
agency no longer supports its own rule, why should the Attorney General, the 
chief legal officer, be able to substitute her policy judgment for that of the 
entity empowered to make the policy decisions?92 Similarly, if the Governor is 
the officer charged with setting state policy, it makes sense that the Attorney 
General should defer to the Governor’s (non-legal) policy judgments. 
The structural argument, however, favors the Attorney General in matters 
involving legal, as opposed to policy, judgments.93 Presumably, a primary 
reason for having an independent attorney general is to allow for independent 
legal judgment. Empowering the Governor to be the final authority on legal 
decisions would make this independence a nullity (as well as, nonsensically 
 
89.  For a discussion of the Attorney General’s obligations to refuse to defend unconstitutional 
laws, see Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable 
Statutes, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2000, at 7; and Seth P. Waxman, 
Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1073, 1088 (2001). 
90.  251 N.W.2d 510 (Iowa 1977). 
91.  Id. at 512. 
92.  Id. at 516. 
93.  Affording the Attorney General the power to exercise independent legal judgment (e.g., to 
provide the Governor with an interpretation of the meaning of a law) is not necessarily 
inconsistent with the Governor’s duty to assure that the laws are faithfully executed. 
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enough, vesting in a non-legal officer the power to have the final say on legal 
meaning).94 
To be sure, the line between legal judgment and policy decision is 
sometimes blurred. (Some might even suggest that all law is policy-based.95) 
But even if all legal decisions have some policy overtones, as Motor Club of Iowa 
suggests, not all policy decisions involve law. The truly difficult cases, in this 
respect, are those in the third category discussed in this Section, dealing with 
the Attorney General’s power to institute lawsuits against private parties on 
behalf of the state. No doubt the decision to bring cases such as the antitrust 
action in United Transportation96 or the civil nuisance action in Haskell97 
involves the exercise of legal judgment. But it also involves non-legal 
considerations that can be integral to a state’s overall policy agenda. 
Accordingly, whether final authority for such decisions should be deemed to be 
in the province of the Governor, the Attorney General, or both, may depend on 
the particular context, or, as is often the case with statutory enforcement 
matters, legislative intent. 
The structural argument more consistently favors the Attorney General in 
the first category of cases previously discussed, those concerning the power of 
the Office to refuse to take the position of executive branch officers or agencies 
in ongoing litigation. First, assuming the Attorney General’s actions are based 
upon legal, rather than policy, judgments, her authority to refuse to take the 
executive branch client’s position reflects her structural role as the state’s chief 
legal officer. Second, recognizing her prerogatives in this respect also furthers 
the policy of having an executive officer whose fealty extends primarily to the 
rule of law rather than to the litigation needs of any particular 
administration.98 Third, allowing the Attorney General to oppose the Governor 
or other executive branch officer in court reflects another benefit of the divided 
executive—it promotes a fuller and more thorough examination of intra-
 
94.  See Manchin v. Browning, 296 S.E.2d 909, 924 (W. Va. 1982) (Neely, J., dissenting) (“To 
take the control of the State’s case away from the ‘chief “law-trained” officer of the State’ 
and inject the opinions of [an executive] officer who has no legal training is nonsensical.”). 
95.  Cf. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY 589 (2002) (observing 
that all lawyers and judges are at times legal realists). 
96.  Ohio v. United Transp., Inc., 506 F. Supp. 1278 (S.D. Ohio 1981); see also supra notes 69-71 
and accompanying text. 
97.  State ex rel. Haskell v. Huston, 97 P. 982 (Okla. 1908); see also supra notes 75-76 and 
accompanying text. 
98.  See generally LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE 
OF LAW 277 (1987) (describing the Solicitor General’s Office as independently committed to 
the rule of law). 
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executive disputes, both in court and in pre-litigation consultation, than would 
occur if the Governor were empowered to impose his position unilaterally.99 
Indeed, the values of intrabranch litigation have been implicitly recognized 
even within the federal executive in cases like United States v. Nixon100 and 
Tennessee Valley Authority v. United States EPA,101 where courts have refused to 
dismiss intrabranch litigation as non-justiciable on grounds that the requisite 
adversarial component was missing when the U.S. government was effectively 
suing itself.102 Rather, the courts heard both sides of the issues involved, 
presumably reaching a more considered judgment than might have occurred if 
the matters had been decided entirely within the executive branch.103 The 
results in state cases involving intrabranch disputes, one would suspect, would 
be similarly informed. 
Finally, the structural argument plays its clearest role in supporting the 
Attorney General’s power in the second category of cases, those in which she 
sues another part of the executive branch for exceeding its authority. Indeed, if 
the purpose of the divided executive is to create an intrabranch system of 
checks and balances,104 there is no better mechanism to achieve this result than 
dividing executive power between a chief executive and a chief legal officer. 
After all, who other than the state’s chief legal officer is better poised to make 
the judgment of whether a state officer has exceeded his legal and 
constitutional authority? (Moreover, because the Attorney General is further 
removed than the Governor from the political pressures and demands that face 
 
99.  For this reason, the common rule that the Governor may retain separate counsel when the 
Attorney General refuses to take his position also makes sense. See, e.g., Ex parte Weaver, 570 
So. 2d 675 (Ala. 1990) (allowing the Governor to intervene and take a position in opposition 
to the Attorney General). 
100.  418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
101.  278 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 2002), opinion withdrawn in part sub nom. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. 
Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2003). 
102.  Id. at 1197. 
103.  As Neal Devins reports, the Supreme Court, in furtherance of its interest in fully hearing an 
issue, has occasionally chided the Solicitor General for not reporting intrabranch disputes. 
See Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General Control over Independent 
Agency Litigation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 255, 315-16 (1994). 
104.  See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. 
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state government,105 she may be able, other things being equal, to approach the 
issues regarding the bounds of authority more dispassionately.106) 
The most compelling structural argument supporting the Attorney 
General’s authority to police the boundaries of executive power, however, rests 
in the inherent weaknesses of the alternative solution—specifically with the 
lack of inherent checks that would occur in a system in which the Governor had 
the final say. For example, in State ex rel. Condon v. Hodges,107 the South 
Carolina Supreme Court permitted the Attorney General to sue the Governor 
for circumventing the provisions of an appropriations bill. Had the court 
allowed the Governor to quash the action, the advantages of the divided 
executive would have been eviscerated because the Governor would effectively 
have become the judge of his own authority. There would be neither check nor 
balance in such a structure.108 
E. Lessons from the Divided Executive 
The preceding Sections suggest that the state experience with the divided 
executive and the independent Attorney General hold a number of lessons. 
First, as its architects intended, the divided executive model disperses power109 
and checks executive branch excess.110 Second, under the divided executive, the 
Office of the Attorney General is, or can be, appropriately independent of 
gubernatorial control. Neither ethical constraints nor structural concerns, 
 
105.  She may also, because of the traditions of her office, have greater insulation from political 
pressure because of her perceived role in upholding the rule of law, although one would 
think that this perception might vary widely among specific personalities. 
106.  This is not to say that politics will never play a role in an attorney general’s decisions. It is 
undoubtedly no accident that the legal positions of Attorneys General Salazar and Baker in 
their respective redistricting and reapportionment cases reflected the positions of their 
political party. See People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221 (Colo. 2003); Perdue v. 
Baker, 586 S.E.2d 606 (Ga. 2003). 
107.  562 S.E.2d 623 (S.C. 2002). 
108.  See People ex rel. Deukmejian v. Brown, 624 P.2d 1206, 1212 (Cal. 1981) (Richardson, J., 
dissenting) (noting that allowing the Governor to prohibit the Attorney General from 
seeking a judicial pronouncement on the legality of legislation that the Governor would 
implement would cause the “system of checks and balances envisioned by the Constitution 
[to] fail”). 
109.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Mattson v. Kiedrowski, 391 N.W.2d 777, 782 (Minn. 1986) (holding 
that the legislature may not strip a constitutionally established, independent, executive 
officer of her independent core functions because to do so would “thwart” the Framers’ 
intent to divide executive powers). 
110.  See Condon, 562 S.E.2d at 623 (holding that the South Carolina Attorney General can sue the 
Governor for appropriations violations). 
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properly understood, demand that the Attorney General exclusively represent 
the Governor’s interests. Third, by insulating the Attorney General’s legal 
authority from gubernatorial control, the divided executive protects against 
executive branch overreaching by dedicating an executive officer to uphold the 
rule of law. Additionally, as the example of intrabranch litigation suggests, 
attorney general independence promotes fuller decision-making before 
governmental action by assuring consideration of a wider range of concerns 
than if the Governor acted alone.111 Fourth, the divided executive can be 
constructed to accommodate a variety of interests. A state, for example, may 
protect the right of an attorney general to exercise independent legal judgment 
against the Governor’s position in a particular matter while still requiring the 
Attorney General to advance the interests of the Governor when her 
disagreement is based on pure policy112 or upon any other factor deemed to fit 
best within the final authority of the Governor. In this way, the Governor’s 
prerogatives can be accommodated as well. 
This then leads to a final lesson. The proponents of the federal unitary 
executive have argued that other structures are destined to fail because they 
would lead to weakened executives fraught with internal conflict and lack of 
accountability. The state experience has shown, however, that this has not 
occurred. After all, the divided executive has been the rule, rather than the 
exception, in virtually every state for most of the nation’s history, yet there is 
little to suggest that it has created endemic dysfunction. The final lesson from 
the state experience with the divided executive, in short, is that, despite the 
doubts of the unitarians, the structure has been proven to work. The next Part, 
accordingly, will ask whether the model may also be appropriate for the federal 
government. 
 
111.  See supra notes 101-103 and accompanying text; see also Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances 
in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 134 (1994) (“Diversifying the 
voices heard in government not only helps to prevent one point of view from becoming too 
strong, but also promotes the affirmative goal of democratizing governmental decision-
making.”). Involving more than one actor in the decision-making process, as the divided 
executive requires, also can improve transparency which, in turn, can help improve the 
democratic process by informing the electorate as to the bases of executive branch actions. 
See Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107 (2000). 
112.  Iowa appears to be one state that has adopted this approach. Compare Motor Club of Iowa v. 
Dep’t of Transp., 251 N.W.2d 510 (Iowa 1977) (holding that the Attorney General does not 
have the power to supersede the policy decision of a state agency in pursuing an appeal), 
with Fisher v. Iowa Bd. of Optometry Exam’rs, 476 N.W.2d 48 (Iowa 1991) (holding that 
the Attorney General has the authority to guide state litigation consistent with what he 
believes are the interests of justice). 
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ii. an independent federal attorney general? 
A. The Increasingly Powerful (and Unchecked) Presidency 
More than fifty years ago, Justice (and former Attorney General) Robert 
Jackson observed that the “real powers” of the presidency had expanded far 
beyond the authority afforded the Office of the Attorney General under the 
Constitution.113 Since Jackson’s era, as many of the participants in this 
Symposium attest, presidential power has only continued to increase, 
particularly in the areas of foreign policy and national security.114 The reasons 
for this expansion extend beyond the ambitions and personalities of those who 
have held the Office.115 Rather, the exigencies of decision-making in these areas 
inevitably vest power in the entity that can react most swiftly; in virtually every 
case, this entity is the executive. Congress, for example, cannot decide quickly 
enough after hostilities break out whether those hostilities are a sufficient basis 
on which to declare war; the courts cannot adjudicate the question of whether 
the President should have first consulted with Congress before taking military 
action.116 
 
113.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 653-54 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
114.  See Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous 
Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006) (proposing the creation of checks and balances 
within the executive branch); Harold Hongju Koh, Setting the World Right, 115 YALE L.J. 
2350 (2006); Jonathan Macey, Executive Branch Usurpation of Power: Corporations and Capital 
Markets, 115 YALE L.J. 2416 (2006) (discussing how the federal executive has taken on a 
disproportionate role in what was previously a central domain of state law regulation). But 
see Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Commentary, The President: Lightning Rod or 
King?, 115 YALE L.J. 2611 (2006); Todd D. Peterson, The Law and Politics of Shared National 
Security Power, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 747, 761 (1991) (reviewing HAROLD HONGJU KOH, 
THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 
(1990)) (arguing that Congress has substantial power to control the President’s national 
security powers). According to Peterson, the problem in this area is not that the President 
has assumed too much power; it is that Congress has exercised too little. See Peterson, supra, 
at 767. 
115.  This is not to say that personality has not played a part. The efforts of Presidents Reagan 
and Clinton, for example, to give the President greater control over federal agency action 
have helped to consolidate presidential authority over the administrative state. See Elena 
Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001). 
116.  The power that comes with being the first to act, moreover, does not substantially abate 
even after the initial crisis is over. Crisis decisions are not easily undone. When the executive 
decides to commit the military to armed conflict, the inevitable result is a “rally round the 
flag” reaction that reinforces the initial decision. Mark Tushnet, Controlling Executive Power 
in the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2673, 2678 (2005); see also Korematsu v. United 
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The contemporary inter-branch imbalance, moreover, is further 
compounded by the fact that the President has at his command resources 
unimaginable at the time of the Founding. In addition to the enormous 
military power that the President is able to unleash without any significant ex 
ante check, the President has at his disposal agencies such as the CIA and the 
FBI, which provide the President with ample opportunity to use their 
enormous capabilities for mischief, including the invasion of individual rights 
through investigation, surveillance, and detention. At the same time, because 
their activities are inherently secretive, these agencies are not meaningfully 
subject to effective oversight by the other branches or by the media. 
The result of this is that Congress and the courts seem increasingly unable 
to check and balance presidential power in particularly critical areas.117 
Consequently, we have seen the President’s escalating ability to unilaterally 
lead the nation into armed conflict, avoid public oversight in the war on terror 
and other matters, detain and suspend the civil liberties of individuals 
(including American citizens), and advance an expansive understanding of 
inherent constitutional powers that flies in the face of congressional and 
international restrictions.118 Accordingly, if Justice Scalia was correct in writing 
that the “purpose of the separation and equilibrium of powers in general, and 
of the unitary Executive in particular, was not merely to assure effective 
government but to preserve individual freedom,”119 there are serious questions 
as to whether the existing structure can still effectively promote this goal. Too 
much presidential power now lies unchecked. 
On paper at least, there is a watchdog guarding against executive branch 
excess. The Federal Attorney General (and the Department of Justice that she 
heads) reviews the legality of executive branch action, either in preparation for 
litigation or in her capacity as legal adviser to the President.120 And consistent 
 
States, 323 U.S. 214, 244-45 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (discussing the practical 
difficulties involved in having courts second-guess military decisions). 
117.  See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1727 (1996). 
118.  E.g., Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales, 
Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU 
GHRAIB 172, 172-73 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) (arguing that the 
President’s power to act under his authority as Commander-in-Chief is absolute and cannot 
be circumscribed by domestic or international prohibitions on torture). 
119.  Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Steven G. 
Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 
105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1155 (1992) (“The genius of the American Constitution lies in its use 
of structural devices to preserve individual liberty.”). 
120.  The key divisions of the Justice Department in this respect are the Office of the Solicitor 
General, charged with litigating cases before the Supreme Court, and the Office of Legal 
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with the Office’s common law heritage,121 some of the tenants have claimed 
that their primary duty is to the law rather than to the administration that they 
were appointed to serve.122 
But under the unitary executive framework, it is the President’s, and not 
the Attorney General’s, position on the duties and obligations of the Office that 
controls. And by his power of appointment or otherwise, the President can 
assure that the Attorney General’s and Department of Justice’s primary fealty is 
to his administration and not to some abstract view of the law.123 Without any 
structural assurance of independence, in short, the Office of the Attorney 
General is only as independent as the President wants it to be. 
B. An Independent Federal Attorney General? 
The question, then, is should the Office of the Attorney General become 
independent? The suggestion is not novel. Congressional hearings124 on the 
subject were held in the wake of the Watergate scandal, and President Carter 
was sufficiently intrigued that he asked the Justice Department to opine 
formally on whether a proposal to make the Office an independent agency 
would be constitutional. (The Department concluded that it would not.125) The 
fact that forty-eight states employ such a structure also suggests that the idea is 
not all that radical, particularly when one remembers that it is not at all clear 
that the Office was intended to be controlled by the President in the first place. 
 
Counsel, charged with providing legal advice. See Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled 
Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 MICH. L. REV. 676, 682 (2005) 
(characterizing these offices as the “principal constitutional interpreters for the executive 
branch”). 
121.  See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text. 
122.  For example, Attorney General Edward Bates, who served under Lincoln, reportedly stated 
that it was his duty “to uphold the Law and to resist all encroachments, from whatever 
quarter, of mere will and power.” LUTHER A. HUSTON ET AL., ROLES OF THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 51 (1968). Robert Jackson, on the other hand, apparently 
viewed his obligations differently. Looking back at his role as Attorney General from the 
perch of a Supreme Court Justice, he described an opinion he offered as Attorney General as 
“partisan advocacy.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 648 n.17 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring). 
123.  See, e.g., Dan Eggen, Staff Opinions Banned in Voting Rights Cases, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 
2005, at A3 (discussing how the President’s political appointees can remove or redeploy staff 
attorneys if they find them too independent). 
124.  See Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Separation of Powers of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. (1974). 
125.  See Proposals Regarding an Independent Attorney General, 1 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 75, 77-
78 (1977). 
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Early versions of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which established the Office, 
contemplated that the Supreme Court would appoint the Attorney General. 
Even the enacted provision did not clearly provide for presidential 
appointment.126 Moreover, the Judiciary Act did not expressly provide that the 
Attorney General would serve at the President’s will, as it had provided for 
other executive branch positions.127 The creation of an independent Office of 
the Attorney General, in short, may not have been all that far outside the 
Framers’ design. 
That said, there are some reasons why the state experience with divided 
government in the form of an independent attorney general may not easily 
translate to the federal government. First, most state governments do not 
conform to a three-branch separation of powers model as rigidly as the federal 
government, and the inclusion of a separate independent executive officer may 
upset the balance and design of the federal structure in a more fundamental 
way than would occur in the states. Second, the need for an independent 
attorney general to check against executive branch overreaching may be greater 
at the state level because state legislatures are often part-time and therefore 
unable to effectively police the actions of the full-time officers of the executive 
branch.128 (To be sure, there is a strong counterpoint to this argument in that 
there may be a greater need for an additional check at the federal level because, 
while the federal government may be available to check against any excesses by 
the state executives, there is no comparable external authority that can check 
the federal government.) Third, the powers of the Federal Attorney General are 
far greater, particularly in her centralized authority over criminal matters, than 
in any of the State Attorney General offices because, in most states, 
prosecutorial authority is localized and not under attorney general control. 
 
126.  See Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of the Attorney General in Our Constitutional Scheme: In 
the Beginning There Was Pragmatism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 561, 567 & n.24. According to Bloch, 
“The President nevertheless immediately assumed that responsibility, went to the Senate for 
advice and consent, presumably reading article II, section 2 to support and perhaps require 
this approach.” Id. at 567 n.24. Moreover, as Bloch notes, unlike the language found in the 
organic acts establishing the Departments of Foreign Affairs and War, the text of the 
Judiciary Act did not label the Office of the Attorney General as executive. Id. at 578. 
127.  Id. The Office is also not, in any event, purely executive. As a functional matter, the position 
is at least quasi-judicial, both in its role in issuing formal opinions and in its capacity as an 
officer of the court. See Henry J. Abraham & Robert R. Benedetti, The State Attorney General: 
A Friend of the Court?, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 795, 797-98 (1969). The Office may also be 
considered quasi-legislative in the states in which it is also charged with the duty of 
providing advice to the legislature. See STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 16, at 55-56. 
128.  See Brief for Georgia Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae at 4, Perdue v. Baker, 586 S.E.2d 
606 (Ga. 2003) (No. S03A1154). 
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Creating an independent attorney general at the federal level would, 
accordingly, carve out a far broader swath of executive power than at the state 
level. 
The most important distinction suggesting that the structures of the state 
and federal governments are not analogous, however, is that the federal 
government’s role in national security and foreign policy is unlike any 
responsibility within the province of the states. The President’s need to act 
with dispatch and expedience in these areas may create a greater need for 
decision-making to be concentrated in one individual than exists in the states. 
Moreover, separating the Attorney General’s powers from the President may 
infringe upon the President’s ability to execute foreign policy and promote 
national security because questions of legal authority are so critical in this area. 
The argument thus comes full circle. The President’s national security and 
foreign affairs duties arguably call for concentrating power in the President, 
but the dangers of excess in those areas also raise the greatest need for an 
intrabranch system of checks and balances. Accordingly, in appraising this 
tension, it may be worthwhile to revisit the classic arguments of energy and 
efficiency, political accountability, and separation of powers that have been 
advanced in support of the unitary executive. 
1. Energy and Efficiency 
The first classic objection to dividing the executive, stemming from 
Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist No. 70, is that unitariness is needed to 
foster energy and efficiency.129 Undoubtedly some energy and efficiency 
 
129.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 423-24 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
Hamilton’s argument actually involves four separate points. First, a unitary executive is 
necessary to allow the executive to act with dispatch; second, a plural executive could lead to 
internal disagreements that would weaken the executive’s ability to carry out its operations; 
third, a unitary executive prevents divisive internal executive branches from developing as 
they would if there were numerous executives competing for power; fourth, a unitary 
executive, by having a national constituency would be more energetic on behalf of the entire 
national community and not distracted by local geographic pressures. 
The last two arguments can be immediately dismissed in the context of the divided 
executive. A Federal Attorney General would not be subject to the pressures of local faction 
as would a member of Congress because, like the President, she would be a nationally 
selected officer (whether elected or appointed) and therefore responsive to the needs of the 
national constituency. Hamilton’s concern with intra-executive factions, in turn, would not 
be implicated because the models of a plural executive that he addressed (the Roman model, 
in which two magistrates shared expansive power, and an executive council model, which 
required the approval of an independent council before the executive could undertake 
significant action) involved broadly shared powers. Hamilton did not consider a model in 
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concerns would arise if the Attorney General were independent130 because the 
President would need to consult another executive officer and work out any 
disagreements prior to taking action. In part, however, this concern may be 
overstated. Every President already confers with legal advisers when his legal 
authority to take a specific action is ambiguous. The only difference is that 
there would now be an independent voice at the table. 
Still, as the state experience shows, inefficiencies exist. A governor who 
does not need to worry about negative legal advice from an independent officer 
is less likely to be chilled in taking particular actions falling within the gray 
areas of her authority. Inefficiencies are also created, as Perdue v. Baker131 
demonstrated, in litigation when the state is a party. It is anything but efficient 
when both the Governor and the Attorney General separately represent the 
state and take opposite positions. And even when the Attorney General is 
deemed the state’s official representative in litigation, the power of the 
Governor to intervene separately still fosters inefficiency in the allocation of 
resources—not to mention presenting a decidedly mixed message to the courts. 
But the issue, in any event, is not simple inefficiency or lack of energy. As 
the Framers’ three-branch design already recognizes, inefficiencies and 
inhibitions on government actions are not always negatives and can 
affirmatively foster other important goals, such as dispersing power and 
maintaining a system of checks and balances. The actual issue, then, in 
choosing between a unitary and a divided executive is optimal inefficiency: Are 
the benefits offered by the divided executive worth the inefficiency costs? 
Certainly a President who must work through an independent attorney 
general, for example, to initiate an extensive program of warrantless electronic 
surveillance or detention of American citizens may be stilled in his efforts. But 
having presidents less energetic in testing the boundaries of their powers 
would also presumably serve the goal of protecting individual liberty.132 
 
which the chief executive held most of the power while a secondary officer had relatively 
limited authority. When the vast majority of executive power rests with one person, the 
incentive for intra-executive cabals to develop to support the officer with significantly less 
authority seems less likely. 
130.  There is, of course, an initial question as to whether the Framers’ concern with energy still 
applies in the modern era. “Modern government at its most lethargic is energetic beyond the 
Founders’ most reckless speculations.” Flaherty, supra note 117, at 1826. 
131.  586 S.E.2d 606 (Ga. 2003). 
132.  Moreover, to the extent that certain law enforcement functions of the Attorney General are 
truly necessary for the President’s ability to conduct foreign policy and foster national 
security, the provision granting independence to the Attorney General could be qualified, 
consistent with the division of executive powers in some states, to grant presidential 
authority to direct the Attorney General to take particular actions. See, e.g., State ex rel. 
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The second classic argument, also from The Federalist No. 70, is that a 
divided executive undermines political accountability.133 As Hamilton argued, a 
plural executive “tends to conceal faults, and destroy responsibility”134 by either 
increasing the chances that various officers may blame others for any 
miscalculations or errors or by colluding in the first instance to deliberately 
cloud the lines of responsibility and avoid subsequent blame. Additionally, as 
the experience with the independent counsel may have shown, if the Attorney 
General is truly independent, there will be few checks on her when she engages 
in questionable behavior. The possibility for abuse then, as Justice Scalia 
foresaw in Morrison v. Olsen, is considerable.135 
However, it is once again unclear how well these arguments actually 
contradict those in favor of establishing an independent Office of the Attorney 
General. To be sure, lines of accountability between the President and the 
Attorney General could become blurred in certain circumstances. But although 
there may be some problems with blurred accountability, they will not be as 
extensive as in the types of plural executives of concern to Hamilton if the 
scope of the Attorney General’s authority does not extend to all executive 
decisions and pertains only to matters of legal judgment.136 
In fact, an independent attorney general would arguably foster greater 
accountability than the unitary structure. To begin with, there is often no 
political accountability in the current unitary executive because accountability 
requires transparency and, particularly in the areas of national security and 
foreign affairs, much executive action is done in secret.137 The ability (and 
predilections) of the unitary executive to take action removed from all 
 
Jackson v. Coffey, 118 N.W.2d 939 (Wis. 1963). Such an approach could both protect some 
presidential prerogative while providing a political guard against overreaching. 
133.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 129, at 427-28. 
134.  Id. at 427. Again, however, it is worth noting that the type of plural executive addressed by 
Hamilton differed from the divided executive utilized by state governments in that the 
plural executive involved broadly shared powers while the divided executive involved a 
secondary officer with a relatively limited range of authority. See supra note 129. 
135.  487 U.S. 654, 728 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
136.  Additionally, to the extent that the value of political accountability is less to foster 
majoritarian results and more to allow the people to protect themselves from government 
tyranny, a divided executive may complement, rather than undermine, this purpose. See 
Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531 (1998). 
137.  Elena Kagan, Dean, Harvard Law Sch., Remarks at the Yale Law Journal Symposium: The 
Most Dangerous Branch? Mayors, Governors, Presidents and the Rule of Law (Mar. 25, 
2006). 
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oversight, in short, undercuts the accountability claim. To the extent that 
requiring the President to consult with an independent officer leads to greater 
transparency, the interests of accountability are served. Moreover, a divided 
executive has the potential to foster greater accountability than the unitary 
model in another respect. As Peter Shane has argued, the persuasiveness of the 
accountability argument as support for the unitary executive may be overstated 
because the electoral process requires the voter to combine a series of political 
choices into a vote for a single personality who is unlikely to reflect her views 
on all those issues.138 A voter who is pro-life or anti-tax might vote to re-elect a 
President who reflects these positions even if she disagrees with the latter’s 
legal stance on the limits of presidential power. Allowing her to vote separately 
for the officer charged with formulating legal positions may promote greater 
realization of her policy choices. To be sure, this argument may prove too 
much, as it would suggest in its extreme that the executive should be divided 
into an elective office for every galvanizing political issue.139 But again, if the 
role of the Attorney General were defined in relatively narrow terms, the 
overall political accountability of the executive branch could be increased. 
Finally, if the Attorney General is independently elected, as in most states, the 
problems associated with an independent counsel would not exist in the first 
place. Unlike an independent counsel, the Attorney General would not be an 
officer with only one charge and no accountability to any electorate. Rather, 
she would have authority over a wider range of legal matters and responsibility 
to the electorate for deficiencies or errors in judgment. 
In any event, the question of whether a divided executive truly undermines 
political accountability may have been answered by the state experience. There 
is currently little to suggest that, in the overwhelming number of states where 
the Attorney General is independent, the division of authority between the 
Governor and Attorney General has made either politically unaccountable. 
3. Separation of Powers 
The third classic concern, raised by Madison in The Federalist No. 51, is that 
a divided executive undermines separation of powers by weakening the 
executive in its battles with the other two branches of government. Madison 
theorized that because those in power would inevitably attempt to expand their 
 
138.  Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances: The Case of 
Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161, 197-99 (1994). 
139.  Id. at 199 (arguing that if true representation had been the Framers’ goal, they would have 
created a multiple presidency). 
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authority, fortifying each branch was necessary to prevent the encroachments 
of another.140 To Madison, the legislature had the greatest ability to invade the 
prerogatives of the others.141 He thus concluded that, in order to assure that the 
branches were protected “commensurate to the danger of attack,” the 
legislature needed to be divided into two. The executive, however, was to be 
unitary not because it was intended to be powerful for its own sake, but 
because it was needed to constrain the power of the legislature.142 
Certainly, dividing the executive could weaken it in its struggles with 
Congress. But if the bases of Madison’s initial calculations have changed, and 
the executive, and not the legislature, is now the most dangerous branch, then 
restructuring the government to reflect the new reality would be consistent 
with Madison’s vision and design.143 The separation-of-powers argument, in 
short, defends the unitary executive only if the original calculations of the 
defenses needed to counter “the danger of attack” are still accurate. If the 
balance among the branches has shifted in favor of the executive, however, this 
same argument militates in favor of the divided executive. 
4. Designing the Office of the Attorney General 
There are undoubtedly other objections to creating an independent Office 
of the Attorney General beyond the concerns discussed in the last Subsection. 
For example, practically speaking, a President may choose not to consult with 
an attorney general if the latter is independent.144 Thus, in creating the Office, 
it is important to establish the President’s duty to consult before taking certain 
types of actions. Another concern is that even if the presidency is not 
inordinately weakened in relation to Congress, an independent attorney 
general might be weakened, suggesting adoption of measures to protect the 
 
140.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 321-22 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“But the 
great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department 
consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional 
means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for 
defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. 
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.”). 
141.  Id. at 322-23. 
142.  See Greene, supra note 111, at 141-48. 
143.  Flaherty, supra note 117, at 1727. 
144.  Indeed, in this respect, it is notable that the trend in state government has been that 
governors have increasingly employed their own counsel. Matheson, supra note 28, at 19; 
Tierney, supra note 39. 
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Office from over-retaliation.145 Finally, whether the position is elected or 
appointed, steps should be taken to assure that the Office’s ability to function 
effectively is not undermined by politicization.146 
No solution is likely to be free of difficulty, and designing the optimum 
approach will take some development and empirical study that are beyond the 
bounds of this Essay. The critical question, however, is not whether the 
creation of an independent Federal Attorney General would be a perfect 
solution but whether it would be preferable to the current model in which the 
Attorney General is politically dependent on and subservient to the President. 
The workability of the state experience with independent attorneys general 
provides a starting point for assessing the viability and desirability of this 
option as a method for restraining presidential power. The increasing inability 
of the current federal system to check presidential excesses provides reason to 
consider this approach seriously. 
conclusion 
The debate over the unitary executive has tended to disregard the state 
experience, although virtually every state government has a divided executive 
structure. As the state experience demonstrates, a divided executive presents its 
share of concerns. Proponents of the unitary executive correctly point out that 
the structure can impose inefficiency and coordination costs. But the structure 
offers benefits as well. State attorneys general who are not under the control of 
governors are freer to offer objective advice and better able to act in accordance 
with the rule of law rather than in the pursuit of a particular political agenda. 
An independent attorney general’s ability to do so without imposing 
substantial burdens on the efficacy of state government makes the model an 
attractive candidate for adoption at the federal level. The current presidency 
has the potential of becoming a law unto itself as the expediency and demands 
of modern government have, in some critical areas, freed the President from 
the effective oversight of the other two branches. At the same time, the 
President’s ability to control the Office of the Attorney General makes him 
effectively the only arbiter of the legality of his actions. An independent 
attorney general, in the form of the state divided executive, may therefore be an 
 
145.  The Constitution protects, for example, judicial independence by providing Article III 
judges with life tenure and guaranteed compensation. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
146.  Such steps might include making the election non-partisan, holding the election in a 
different year from the presidential election, and making former attorneys general ineligible 
to run for President or Vice President. 
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appropriate model from which to reconstruct a workable system of intrabranch 
checks and balances.  
